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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the prospects for securitization of real estate assets in Brazil. Brazilian
real estate securitization is in its infancy. The economical importance of the country, its
relatively well-developed financial markets, the globalization of capital markets, and the
increasing demand for real estate securities, however, argues for the advancement of real
estate securitization in Brazil.
Real estate operations have been financed with debt and equity securities over the last
years. On the debt side, the S.F.I.(Sistema Financeiro Imobiliario), an initiative designed to
parallel the mortgage backed securities model in the U.S., is intended to broaden the
supply of real estate financing in Brazil and to create a secondary mortgage market.
Residential, industrial, commercial and other kinds of real estate loans will serve as
collateral. One or more public issuers will buy and package mortgages to issue securities,
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do in the U.S.. The Brazilian government is not expected
to provide subsidies or guarantees. Standardization and enhancement of legal guarantees
on collateral are crucial concerns present in the S.F.I., under approval at the Federal
Congress. The S.F.I.'s targeted investors are mostly pension funds, insurance companies
and foreign investors. On the equity side, the Fundos de Investimento Imobiliario (F.I.I.),
in some aspects comparable to U.S. REITs, have been used mostly for tax advantages in
financing new developments. In general, the Brazilian real estate securitization has been
private, without a secondary market and targeted to closed groups of investors.
The prospects for real estate securitization in Brazil are broadly linked to the country's
macro-economy. High levels of inflation, such as Brazil had seen in the past, bring
economic disorganization, and are harmful to the prospects for securitization. Other
concerns are related to the information provided to investors and to continual
governmental support to the process, in the form of adopting and maintaining a consistent
and coherent regulatory structure.
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Chapter 1- Introduction
This thesis focuses on securitization of real estate assets in Brazil. The first thing to
understand is what is securitization, what are its uses, and in which ways may it be related
to real estate. These subjects are discussed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 analyzes the background information for real estate securitization in Brazil. The
increasing importance of Brazil in the global economy opens the chapter, followed by an
overview of the country's economic trends and perspectives. This chapter brings to the
reader a description of the dynamics of short-term and long-term real estate investments
over the last few years, as well as an analysis of the recent history of real estate financing
in the country.
Chapter 4 describes the first securitization initiatives and the current state of real estate
securitization in Brazil. Debt and equity initiatives are described, as these initiatives are
possible linkages to a general and more ambitious securitization plan. Special emphasis is
given to the creation of the SFI, an initiative that intends to create a secondary mortgage
market to residential, commercial and industrial real estate using the American "Fannie
Mae" as a model.
Chapter 5 discusses the agents that are participating or whose participation is intended in
the real estate securitization process. The analysis is organized to cover main agents, such
as the government and the banks, the capital providers (the pension funds, the insurance
companies, the foreign and the national investors), and the capital users (the developers
and contractors, and the borrowers). For each group of participants, the discussion tries to
frame the motivations, conflicts and the possible gains or losses derived from the
securitization process.
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of this thesis, intended to summarize the opportunities
and challenges of real estate securitization in Brazil.
Appendix A describes relevant tax and legal considerations as well as governmental
incentives and restrictions relating to real estate securitization. Appendix B briefly
describes the history of real estate securitization in the United States, its recent trends,
and how it has acquired the importance that it has today.
Chapter 2 - Securitization and Real Estate Securitization
Securities are financial assets (pieces of paper) that companies or individuals sell to raise
capital. The value of these pieces of paper comes from the claim they have on real assets
and the cash-flows those real assets produce'. Securitization can generally be defined as
the transformation of a financial claim on any asset into a new security. This process
generally results in an anticipation of cash receipts from the real asset to the originator and
a reward in the form of profit on the sale of the new securities, which then have an indirect
(subordinate) claim on the cash-flows from the real asset. If conveniently packaged and
tranched, an asset or a pool of assets may generate different classes of securities with
different types of risks and returns, that will satisfy diverse investors' investment
preferences.
Generally, any asset producing cash flow in a reasonably predictable way may be
securitized. For instance, in the beginning of 1997, the singer David Bowie packaged his
future royalties into a US$ 55 million asset-backed bond issue payable over 10 years at
7.9% per year interest 2. Actually, some industries are currently more securitized than
others. The same can be said for countries. When compared to other industries, real estate
securitization has been modest, even in the United States. Stewart Meyers argues that
securitization is perhaps not as necessary in real estate because the tangibility of the assets
1 Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C., Principles of Corporate Finance, U.S.A., McGraw-Hill,
1996, 5th Edition, pg. 3
2 Mathews, Jay,Securities Oddity: the Bowie Bond; with Asset-Backed Debt, the Rock Star
Plays a Financial Instrument, Washington Post, Feb 6, 1997, p.C1.
brings more protection to investors than in other industries3 . Nonetheless, real estate
securitization has grown rapidly in the U.S., has a strong presence in Europe, and is
spreading globally in the 90's.
International investment in bonds and stocks is being followed by international real estate
investing, increasingly promoting the inclusion of those assets in the global capital
markets. In comparison to direct real estate investment, real estate securities are
advantageous to investors as they often facilitate the capital flow between real estate and
other kind of investments4 . Eichholtz and Koedijk' studied the correlation between returns
in real estate securities investments in 25 countries and U.S. REITs. They concluded
international diversification contributes to diminish institutional portfolio risks.
The existence of a secondary market is fundamental to securitization. While in a primary
market assets are purchased and securities are originated, the secondary market provides
liquidity to these securities and an exit strategy to investors, as there the existing securities
can be re-traded.
In the case of real estate debt, the secondary mortgage market facilitates the flow of
money from investors to lenders, extending the universe of resources to financing behind
the originating banks and financial institutions' deposits. The secondary market replenishes
3 Meyers, Stewart C., Unpublished speech ,Semi-Annual Meeting of the MIT Center for Real Estate, May
1997.
4 McMahan, John, Changing the Real Estate Environment, Real Estate Issues, April 1997,pp.3-7.
5 Eichholtz, Piet M. A. and Koedijk, Kees G., The Global Real Estate Securities Market, Real Estate
Finance, Spring 1996 Issue, pp. 76-82.
the funds used by mortgage originators, allowing originators to maintain new originations
independent of the level of interest rates. Furthermore, a secondary market may also serve
to correct imbalances of mortgage credit among a country's diverse regions. To be
successful, a secondary market typically needs homogeneity of investment contracts or
financial claims to attract investors that did not participate in the primary market and do
not have the specific knowledge of the industry other than the securities themselves. A
successful secondary market also needs to have a critical mass of operations that will
generate information and share trading costs. Equally important, the diverse risks often
associated with securitization must be segregated and distributed among participants. Risk
segregation is essential to reduce the required yields of investors who will accept the
security's intrinsic risks, but would prefer to avoid the risks associated with performance
of the originator.
The U.S. model of real estate securitization is generally considered to be very successful.
It has managed to bring advantages to borrowers by saving them about 50 basis points on
mortgage rates6 ; to lenders, by increasing capital availability; and to investors, by pushing
out the limits of the risk-return curve. In 1997, the secondary market for residential
mortgages was the largest fixed income investment class in the United States other than
government debt. Approximately 50% of the residential mortgage loans and less than 10%
of the commercial investments in real estate are securitized in the United States, and these
percentages are still growing. Liquidity, non-lumpiness, low transaction costs, easy
6 Riddiough, Timothy, Real Estate Capital Markets Course Notes, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology,Spring 1997, p. 93.
diversification, disclosure, discipline and professional management are the general
advantages of real estate securities over direct investment in the underlying properties.
Institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are increasingly
being swayed by these factors, and are destining more of their investment capital to real
estate securities.
Chapter 3 - Background Information for Real Estate Securitization
in Brazil
3.1 Brazil's Economic Trends
In the last few years, a number of countries have seen their classification in the financial
world shift from Developing Countries to Emerging Countries. To emerge is to come into
view, as says the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, and the new designation reflects
the increasing importance of these countries in the global economy.
Within this group, Brazil is notable for its size, its demographics, and its economic
importance. It is the largest and most populated country in Latin America. The country
occupies more than 50% of South America, being slightly larger than the U.S. in its
continental portion. With US$ 750 billion of GDP and 157 million in population, Brazil's
economy is the eight-largest in the world. The United States , as a comparison, has more
than US$7 trillion of GDP (approximately ten times larger) and a population in excess of
250 million (two-thirds larger). Interestingly, Brazil's GDP is higher than China's, and had
consistently been larger than countries as India, Russia and Mexico.
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Brazil's economy is considered well-balanced: it has a significant installed capacity of
industries and is nearly self-sufficient from the standpoint of agricultural goods and
alternative sources of energy. 55% of the its exports come from manufactured goods.
These exports, corresponding to a very low percentage of the GDP when compared to
other countries (6.4%), reached US$ 47.8 in 19968.
Impressive changes have been be observed in the Brazilian economy within the last
decade. After enduring severe inflation through ingenuous indexation, the Plano Real
brought price stability since 1994. It was done fundamentally through a new trustworthy
7 A Festa do Investidor, Revista Veja, p. 132-135, June 18, 1997
8Unsigned Article, Reforming Brazil, The Economist, May 17, 1997, pp. 38-40
currency and global competition enhancement 9. Inflation came down from 40% per month
to 10% per year in 1996, the lowest rate since the 1950s. In addition, protectionism
decreased substantially, with import taxes being reduced since the beginning of the 90's
from 42% on average to 13% in 1996, and competition has challenged and changed
previously well- protected Brazilian companies. State presence in areas out of its core
competence has decreased, with the selling to investors of companies formerly owned by
the governmental entities, as the mining conglomerate CVRD ( Companhia Vale do Rio
Doce) , sold in May for US$ 3.2 billion. Recent government declarations about selling the
telecommunication system (valued around US$ 100 billion) to private sector enhance this
trend 0 .
On the other hand, trade deficits as a consequence of a lasting 15% overvaluation of the
country's currency have been compensated by the privatization process and foreign
investments. Fiscal and administrative reforms are still needed, and the government has to
make them approved by a Congress formed by volatile political parties and shadowed by
the very detailed and state-oriented 1988 Constitution. Even though country fund
reserves, in mid-1997 around US$ 58 billion, seemed to be enough to sustain the
government economic policy, foreign investment is primordial to provide the resources to
sustain the country's economically competitive position within the world and to enhance
the modernization of the economy. Brazil's economy was one of the world's fastest-
9 During a period of 6 months, the country had two currencies, the Cruzado and the URV, the latter
relatively indexed to the American dollar. At the end of this period, as the URV gained acceptance as non-
inflationed, it was transformed in Real, and the Cruzado suppressed. Global competition limited the rising
of prices during the process.
10The Economist, Ibid.
growing during long periods in this century, and the last years' economic opening to the
world intends to increase the current 4% annual GDP growth rate. Stability of prices,
declining interest rates and increasing of the GDP are factors that have encouraged the
external direct investment in the country, that totaled US$ 9.2 billion in 1996 and US$ 5.9
billion in the first five months in 1997.
Direct Foreign in Investment in Brazil 1990 - 1997
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One of the country's most serious problems is its rather deep economic inequalities, which
has led to widespread poverty. High levels of inflation exacerbated these inequalities, since
the poor could not protect their earnings against the purchasing-power erosion as price
level increased. It also meant to the companies prioritization of financial engineering
instead of production, and printing money, the ultimate cause and consequence of
inflation, was the easy way for the government to face an unbalanced budget. The recent
low level of inflation has allowed at least 8 million people to get out of the poverty level
"Revista Veja, Ibid.
and enter the consumer market, further enhancing economic growth, accordingly to the
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America12 . Firms have recently increased their
concern with competitiveness, looking at both modernization and alliances to enhance
their newly designed medium and long-term strategies.
The last years' economic changes were reflected in the Brazilian capital markets, that have
grown remarkably, along with the financial institutions dealing with securities. Created in
1986, the BM&F- Commodities and Future Exchange of Sao Paulo- is the fourth largest
derivative trading market in the world, reaching 135 million traded contracts in 1996. The
Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo, founded in 1890, is the most important in the country,
responsible for more than 80% of Brazilian stock transactions. In 1996 it included 547
registered companies, with a total volume of capitalization of US$ 189.2 billion. Its
average daily trading volume was around US$ 400 million. Financial institutions were
responsible for 53% of the transactions, and foreign investors 24%.
3.2 The Demand for Long-Term Investment Instruments
In contrast, as a consequence of the recent highly-inflationary period, the instruments of
long-term financing have remained relatively underdeveloped. Fixed income long-term
investments have been unsuccessfully stimulated by the government in the last 30 years
Most notably, 6 months has been the maximum term accepted by the market. If indexation
can deal adequately with the inflation risks, as indeed it did for long periods of time, the
12The Economist, Ibid.
reason for the failure to develop long-term debt instruments is the lack of an adequate
demand for these instruments. The Brazilian social security system, for a number of
reasons, has worked in a distribution regime, instead of a more desirable capitalization
regime, explains the Prof Ma'rio Henrique Simonsen, ex- Minister of Finance". In this
case, distribution of resources prevails over capitalization, generating cumulative deficits
to the system's budget. This problem will have to be faced through a social security
system reform, as the distribution regime is not sustainable in a country with decreasing
birth-rates and increasing life expectancy. Other sources of savings, such as reserve funds
for necessities or opportunities, need the liquidity that the long-term fixed income
investments have not offered. This situation has changed with the recent increasing
presence of the pension funds. In the last years they became the major investors in Brazil.
Their long-term and predictable liabilities are well matched by long-term fixed income
investments. Even if only continued economic stability will provide the foundations to
growth of these instruments, the existence of an important component of demand could be
the factor capable of making the market for long-term fixed income securities finally
develop.
3.3 The S.F.H. -Sistema Financeiro da Habitagso (Residential Financing
System)
Inflation also contributed to exhaust the existing official real estate financing system, the
S.F.H. Serving only the residential sector, it was created in 1964 and since then generated
more than 6 million home mortgages using mainly the resources from cadernetas de
13 Simonsen, Mirio H., Como poderd ser o mercado de hipotecas no Brasil, SF1 - Um Novo Modelo
Habitacional Conference Notes, org. by ABECIP, Brasilia, Brazil, Nov. 1995, pp 190-192.
poupanca (saving accounts) and from the F.G.T.S. (working period guarantee funds)".
Real estate notes issued by financial institutions were envisioned as an additional important
source of investments, but their acceptance was low due to their long-term and lack of
liquidity. The S.F.H. was constructed with care and ingenuity, and was even used as
model for other countries looking for solutions to their residential problems. Price-
indexation was a strong concern in its creation, as inflation's presence had contributed to
destroy the previous residential financing models. Indexation was used to avoid negative
interest rates in the amortization, as inflation could easily surpass the nominal interest
rates.
Nominal interest rates are defined as follows:
1 +1 nominal = (1 + inflation rate) (1 + I real)
If inflation surpasses the determined nominal interest rates:
(1 + inflation rate) > (1 +1 nominal)
Then:
(1 + I real ) would be < 1
14 Formed by a social security withholding tax varying from 8 to 11% of the monthly wages, with a
ceiling of approximately US$ 1,000 per person in April 1997.
and I real would be negative. This possibility is avoided through indexation, which
enforces the use of real interest rates and inflation, instead of nominal interest rates.
Indexation served to preserve the buying power of the received cash-flows and to create a
system that could attract private savings to the residential mortgage market. Private
investors' resources are obtained through saving accounts (cadernetas de poupanga), that
pay a price variation index plus 6 % real interest per year. For example, with a 10 %
annual inflation, a $ 100 investment would become after one year:
$ 100 * (1 + inflation rate) (1 + I real )= $100 * 1.10 * 1.06 = $ 116 .6 0
As the resultant interest rate of 16.6% is nominal, and not real, the investor buying power
did not increase at such a percentage. But buying power is, at least in principle preserved,
and this fact explains why the cadernetas de poupanca are so popular in the country, with
millions of small accounts, and serve as a benchmark of a safe investment in the same way
that Treasury Bills do in the U.S..
Just after the creation of the SFH, financial policy refinements began to occur. As
mortgage payments were adjusted each three months and wages only each year, the P.E.S.
(Wage Equivalency Plan) was created. It ruled that even if the outstanding balance of the
loans were adjusted every three months by contractual agreement, the adjustments to the
borrower could only be done annually, using the legal minimum wage variation as the
price indexer.
A schematic hypothetical example illustrates this mechanism. Let us suppose a $ 100,000
loan with a 15-year amortization term, monthly payments, real interest rates of 12% per
year and a 2% per month inflation. These are hypothetical numbers, as inflation was very
volatile, and interest rates and terms changed with different financing plans.
PV = $100,000 I real = 12% = 0.95 % per month
15 years = 180 months
Monthly Payments = $1,150 ( * 12 months = $13,800 in the first year)
15 The Outstanding Loan Balance (OLB) calculation would use the following rates:
1 +1 nominal = (1 + inflation rate) (1 + I real ) = ( 1.02 )12 * ( 1.120) = 1.420 annually
The outstanding loan balance in the end of the year would be OLBdue = ($100,000 * 1.420)- $13,800 =
$128,200. Similar calculation may be done for the following years.
Year OLB due (initial) Payments OLB due (final)"
1 100,000 13,800 128,200
2 128,200 18,180 163,863
3 163,863 23,978 208,707
4 208,707 31,670 264,694
5 264,694 41,284 334,581
To calculate the borrower payment in the second year, let us suppose an initial $100
minimum wage, adjusted to $ 120 in one year. His or her payment will be based in the
following effective interest rate:
(1 + Variation on the minimal wage) (1 + I real) (1.200) * (1.120) = 1.344 (or 34.4%
per year)
OLB payment = ($100,000 * 1.344) - $13,800 $120,600
Year OLBpaymt (initial) Payments OLB paymt (final)
1 100,000 13,800 120,600
2 120,600 17,102 144,984
3 144,984 21,216 173,643
4 173,643 26,349 207,027
5 207,027 32,290 245,955
As we see, an increasing gap between the OLBdue and the OLBpayment would be
created. The final resultant gap would be refinanced to the borrower on the same
conditions as the original loan through a period equal to 50 % of the original amortization
term. In our example, the refinancing period would be of 7.5 years, after the 15-year initial
term.
The current gaps and the final residual observed after the refinancing period were covered
by the creation of a fund, the F.C.V.S. (Wage Variation Compensation Fund), formed
with federal resources and an overtax from borrowers. The system worked well until the
late 70's. Then problems began, as the governmental interventions only happened in one
direction; in 1979 the wages began to be adjusted semi-annually, but the mortgage
payments continued to be adjusted annually. At the end of the 70's, inflation increased to
around 100% per year from the previous 40% level. Salaries never matched prices in a
high-inflation environment, as explains the ex-minister Mailson da N6brega16 , and indexed
mortgaged debt became too heavy to borrowers.
The mere fact that an employee normally received his/her wage on the 10 * day of the next
month contributes meaningfully to this problem. Let us suppose a 10% monthly inflation.
Wages would loose more than 10 % of their purchasing power when received, but the
loan agreement contracts ensure that the monthly payments would be daily indexed. In this
way, the borrower's debt is at least 10% heavier than it was at the contract date, even if
indexed to his or her salary.
Things worsened in the early 1980s, as inflation surpassed 200 % per year, and the wages
were compressed by new adjustment rules. Default rates increased substantially, and the
government began offering subsidies to borrowers. The differences between the
borrower's contracted debt and what they were allowed to pay under existing regulations
16 N6brega, Mailson da, Casa Pr6pria: Vem Ai uma Revolugdo, Folha de S. Paulo, June 6, 97, Caderno
Dinheiro, p.2 .
were assigned to the F.C.V.S., creating a deficit of more than US$ 70 billion in its
account. The larger creditors of this deficit are the F.G.T.S. (the social security),
government social developer entities and lenders ( private and government commercial
banks). The still very successful cadernetas de poupanga were used more and more to
finance this hole instead of their original role of financing residential production (the
current solution to this problem includes the transformation of this debt in privatization
currency securities).
In the beginning of the 1990s the system was showing clear signs of exhaustion. The
400,000 units financed annually in the 1970s and 1980s were reduced to an average of
55,000 per year between 1993 and 1995. Inflation and demagogy led to this situation, in
18N6brega's opinion . Inefficiency of the Justice system worsened it, as it benefited
distressed borrowers and penalized the market as a whole. The understanding of these
problems is crucial to the construction of a new real estate financing model to the country,
and they were effectively taken in account in the design of the new S.F.I. (Real Estate
Financing System).
17 In July 1997, they have the equivalent to approximately US$ 90 billion in account.
18 Ibid.
Chapter 4 -Current State of Real Estate Securitization in Brazil
4.1 General Framework
Compared to the U.S., real estate securitization in Brazil is still in a very early stage of
development. The securitization which has occurred was private, largely a result of direct
financial interests of originators and investors. In a private securitization, the securities are
sold to a close group of investors, and a secondary market does not necessarily exist. This
kind of securitization has mostly provided funds to specific developments. Market
familiarity with these private forms of financing is, however, increasing.
A fundamental characteristic of any real estate securitization is risk segregation. Investors
generally want to be immunized from the company-specific (as opposed to investment-
specific) risks associated with the developer or the property manager. This risk
segregation may be achieved through structuring each individual investment as a Limited
Partnership. This concept regulates the formation of special entities that are legally able to
provide that risk segregation, as the S.P.C.s, Special Purpose Companies, and the F.I.I.s,
Real Estate Investment Funds.
As Brazil has a roman originated legal system, any new security must be regulated by law
to be traded. Consequently, the number of securities available is limited and the financial
engineering of projects must generally be adapted to the existing requirements of regulated
24
securities. Debentures have been the securities most commonly issued to raise capital for
real estate projects. These securities are very similar to bonds, particularly with respect to
their flexibility and fiscal advantages. Their revenues are considered interest payments,
hence deductible expenses for tax purposes. Debentures may have a stated maturity or be
perpetual. Debentures can pay fixed yields or pay yields over any form of indexation. Their
yields may also include participation mechanisms. The kind of guarantees offered may be
subordinate (the debenture holder has priority only to the shareholder), real (guaranteed
by mortgages, for example) or floating (guaranteed by the assets of the company, as
unsecured debt).
The C.V.M. (Securities And Exchange Commission) has among its attributions the
regulation, control and enhancement of the securities market. In 1991, the C.V.M.
approved the first conversion of debentures to a condominium participation. This
conversion is allowed if the exchanged goods are clearly specified, if the general
contractual conditions are maintained, and are subject to the debenture holder's desire.
Transactions of debentures instead of apartments may be advantageous, as they are not
subject to the IBTI tax'8 payment.
Afterwards, the C.V.M. and the financial marketplace began to accept the notion that a
debenture must not necessarily pay interest as a fixed income security. Diverse serial issues
18 IBTI (Real Estate Transmission Inter-Vivos Tax) is a 2 to 6% tax payable by the buyer when a
property is sold or transferred not as a result of death.
with different payment dates began to be accepted to adapt the investment to particular
cash needs of new investments. Until 1991, a company's disclosure of information to the
market and financial structure were not the only conditions to define it as public. Its size,
capital and number of employees were also taken in consideration. After that year, the
C.V.M. and the financial marketplace began to accept public companies independently of
those last criteria, considering for this classification only disclosure and capital structure.
This flexibility made possible the creation of the S.P.C.s, being the next favorable step to
securitization, as Vladimir Rioli' 9 , ex-president of ABAMEC - Brazilian Association of
Capital Market Analysts - explains.
As explained in chapter 3, uncertainties related to long-term fixed income investments in a
highly inflationary environment and lack of an appropriate demand for them had inhibited
the broader use of debentures in financing real estate for a long time. During the 1990's,
the use of debentures was enlarged in a convenient way to be used as a capital source for
real estate projects, as above described. This fact, along with economic stabilization and
the pension funds prominence, led to the first operations related to real estate
securitization in the country.
19 Rioli, Vladimir A., Securitizagdo de Ativos Imobilidirios Atraves de Emissdo de Debentures por
SPCs, Financiamentos para Empreendimentos Imobiliirios Conference Notes, org. by Institute for
International Research, S. Paulo, June 1997, pg 7-12.
4.2 Debt Securities
4.2.1 Securitization of Receivables
The securitization of receivables was regulated in June 1986 and has been used since 1992
in 27 different operations. These real estate receivables totaled approximately US$ 6
billion in 1996. Rioli20 defines three types of operations that use this kind of securitization
in the real estate industry:
" the selling of a project cash flow, normally through perpetual debentures;
* the financing of new developments, generally through the selling of debentures, with
maturity determined by the time of construction or the developer's financing
necessities;
" the anticipation of revenues, used mainly in residential multi-family projects.
Receivables are used as collateral to issue securities and collect capital. The main risks of
these operations are originator risk and credit risk. If possible, a historical analysis of the
receivables may minimize the assumed credit risks. The originator risk may be practically
eliminated through an efficient segregation. The most effective way of doing that has been
through the creation of a S.P.C. (Special Purpose Company) to acquire the receivables
and to sell to investors the collaterized securities. Even being able to anticipate the cash-
flows with lesser costs, straightforward alternatives, as banks simply buying the
receivables and issuing securities, would not provide the protection derived from this risk
segregation.
The S.P.C. is a corporation (S.A.), and must have a defined and unchangeable objective,
such as to issue debentures to finance a specific asset. It is a "paper company", with
minimal organizational structure and using outsourced services. A trustee controls all of
the operations on behalf of investor. An independent auditor listed by C.V.M. verifies the
accounting procedures and a bank is designated to receive and distribute to investors the
revenues. Other agents are sometimes employed, depending on the complexity and on the
objectives of the operations, as a financial manager, a back-up servicer or a rating agency.
Additional debt or any mortgage other than the original liability are not allowed.
Four conditions must be observed to effect an efficient securitization of receivables,
accordingly to Pinheiro Neto Advogados 21:
" True Sale: As definition of Standard & Poor's: "Unless the Rating Agency concludes
that the Seller has absolutely transferred its rights to the assets, the Rating Agency will
view the rating of the Seller as a factor in the transaction analysis".
* S.P.C. independence from the originator.
* consistency of cash-flows between receivables and securities' payment obligations.
* additional guarantees: overcollateralization and funds to cover operational expenses.
20 Ibid.
21 Securitizagdo de Recebiveis Conference Notes, Securitizargo de Recebiveis Conference, org. by
FEBRABAN, S. Paulo, June1997.
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Operations targeted to anticipate revenues were recently used in the residential sector.
They were originated by developers that had offered long-term credit to buyers to sustain
sales and needed capital to pursue new developments. The issued securities are
comparable to RMBS, based on their pass-through structure, with a pro-rata distribution
of cash-flows without the pre-payment scenario.
The credit risk guarantee in these operations was provided mainly by overcollateralization
(use of additional receivables). As the default risk still remains with the developer, who is
the guarantor of the receivables, each participant developer contributed to a reserve fund
established as a subsidiary of the S.P.C.. This reserve fund would be used to guarantee the
substitution of distressed receivables, the hedging and index matching, and would be
accessible even in the case of the developer's bankruptcy.
Some general procedures were adopted to restrict the risks: most notably, the receivables
should be originated by various developers, from private contracts independent of the
S.F.H. (the governmental and sometimes subsidized financing system) regulation and
interference, and at least 40% of the real estate acquisition price should have just been
paid by the original debtors (this latter condition can be compared to establishing a LTV -
Loan to Value- limit of 0.60). The negotiated debentures were normally long-term and,
consequently, the S.P.C. would quickly accumulate cash. Prepayment was not yet a
concern, as the current conditions do not stimulate refinancing operations.
Joio Cesar Botelho de Miranda, coordinator of the Financial System Board of SECOVI,
the Developers and Property Managers' Association of Sio Paulo, explains that a full
securitization requires yields of inflation indexation plus 15% to investors. Added to this is
3 to 4% of issuance, management and guarantee costs. Even if the private model would
reduce these last costs to 1.5 to 2% per year structuring costs, lack of standardization and
taxes restricted a lot of this kind of operations22 .
Until mid 1997, three securitization operations were completed, having as originators the
developers Rossi, Cidadela and a group of developers put together by SECOVI. The use
of these operations were not supposed to grow too much, as new instruments to be
introduced would allow the developers to come back to their development role, leaving
the financial task to finance institutions23 .
4.2.2 The S.F.I. - Sistema Financeiro Imobiliairio (Real Estate Finance System)
4.2.2.1 - Overview
The S.F.I. is the new real estate financing system proposed by the ABECIP (Savings and
Real Estate Credit Entities' Brazilian Association) and being directed by the Government.
22 Botelho de Miranda, J. C. M., A Engenharia Imobiliiria-Financeira nos Fundos Imobiliirios e
Debentures Imobiliarias. Financiamentos para Empreendimentos Imobiliirios Conference, org. by
Institute for International Research. S. Paulo, Brazil, June 1997.
23 Ibid.
It was produced as an answer to the existent financing model exhaustion, and results of an
extensive research comparing various overseas experiences. A more stable currency over
the last three years, the end of the paternalist rental laws and the growth of importance of
institutional investors point out a favorable environment for a new real estate financial
system.
Three are the basic components of this proposed new financing system:
1) financing conditions are to be freely negotiated between borrower and lender, without
any responsibility or liability to the Government Treasury. This would be possible
through the differentiation of low-income population financing, that need subsidies
and will be financed by social security resources, from the other population sectors.
2) the investor's guarantees will be improved, resulting in more capital available to the
real estate sector.
3) declining costs of real estate finance resulting from 2)
Basically, the model to be approved can be described as follows. The individual who
wants to buy a property goes to a real estate loan originator and gets a mortgage loan
collaterized by the property to be bought. This originator may be any financial institution
authorized to originate mortgage loans, such as a mortgage bank. The institution lends
him the money and sells his/her receivables to a companhia securitizadora (securitizing
corporation, companies with roles similar to those of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the
U.S.), clearing in this way the originator's capacity for new financing.
The S.F.I. regulations are under the Congressional approval process since June 1997, in a
maximum priority regime, that is supposed to get this approval in a 3 to 6 month period of
time. Governmental concern has been demonstrated through its attribution to the personal
responsibility of the Minister of Planning, Antonio Kandir.
4.2.2.2 - Guarantees and Fiduciary Alienation
The guarantees offered to investors are a crucial concern in this process. Borrower's
death, permanent disability and property damages will necessarily be insured. Credit risk
insurance will be optional, but will be offered, at least in the first years of operation. In the
case of new development financing, construction completion and default insurances are
optional. All these insurances come to the lender's protection, which ultimately
contributes to the investor's comfort. Mortgage, receivables from real estate sale, and a
new instrument called real estate fiduciary alienation will be able to serve as collateral.
Fiduciary alienation will allow that distressed properties could be taken back in a
reasonable time period from the borrower in default. Under current law, this process
usually takes from 2 to 5 years to occur. Fiduciary alienation is the fundamental part of the
S.F.I. project destined to reduce this period of time. It was adapted from an existing
regulation used since 1969 related to cars and other mobile goods sales. Fiduciary
alienation divides the possession of a property into direct possession and indirect
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possession. The indirect possession is only transferred to the borrower after the last due
payment to the loan originator.
Some defense mechanisms to the borrower will be included in the project. Negotiation in
the case of default would be stimulated by the exigency of a public auction of the
distressed property within 30 days from the date it was taken back. The borrower will
have the right to receive any auction income in excess to the debt and expenses related to
the process. An arbitrage chamber may be called as a mediator in the case of controversy
between lender and borrower. As controversies are expected to increase in inflationary
periods, this chamber should allow the system to survive even with a resurgence of
inflation. The fiduciary alienation is still a political issue in discussion in the Congress
approval process. These discussions might lead to restrict its use for lower income
residential borrowers.
Structure of the Proposed Secondary Mortgage
Market in Brazil
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instruments)
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Source: ABECIP
------------- possible but not probable path, as lacking the risk segregation provided by the
companhia securtizadora and the fiduciary regime.
4.2.2.3 - The Companhias Securitizadoras (Securitizing Corporations)
The companhias securitizadoras will be public corporations with a central role in creating
the mortgage secondary market. Their conception was inspired in the Fannie Mae
presence in the U.S. market. Their objective is to increase the supply of real estate finance
and to provide liquidity to the securities issued from this financing process, extending the
investor's universe to pension funds, insurance companies and foreign institutions. They
will create and enhance credit origination standards, attracting capital market investors
while reducing credit risk premiums. They will also manage the structuring of security
issues, using scale and their own guarantees to control and distribute risks. They will be
responsible for the acceptance of the issued securities as they gain the market's trust.
These securities will be the Certificados de Recebiveis Imobilidrios (C.R.I), created by
law, collaterized by the mortgage contracts and issued with fixed or adjustable interest
rate, plus indexation. The C.R.I. may or may not have a floating guarantee, a general right
on the assets of the companhia securitizadora without the power to interdict the
negotiation of these assets. The companhia securitizadora would be able to offer the
fiduciary regime to investors. This regime establishes the separation of real estate credits
of one operation from the companhia securitizadora's assets, segregating risks. In this
case, a trustee or fiduciary agent is nominated to operate in name of the investors,
collecting and distributing the income. The companhia securitizadora will still be
responsible for the general management, accounting and disclosure information about each
of the created set of credits. Carlos E. D. Fleury, a juridical consultant with ABECIP,
explains that a 50% informal limit relation between the companhia securitizadora's offered
24 Cei
credit and its assets will be established at least in the first years of its operation . Credit
insurance would be an option probably demanded by investors that would provide the
24Fleury, Carlos E.D., interview on June 9, 1997, S. Paulo, Brazil.
insurance companies the conditions to be the a source of market regulation through their
risk analysis instruments.
The first companhia securitizadora to be created will be a non-financial institution called
CIBRASEC- Companhia Brasileira Securitizadora. Luis Eduardo Pinto Lima, Vice
President of ABECIP and probable designated president to the new company, explains
that it will be formed by a partnership among private, public and governmental banks25 . Its
original capital would be US$ 60 million, and each 10% share of one or a set of
institutions will provide a seat on its Board. Ten per cent is also the ceiling limit to any
company participation, as any superior level would forbid the operations as a credit
originator from any participant. One of the reasons for the Fannie Mae success in the U. S.
was the guarantee provided by the government in its first decades. Even in the following
decades, they could offer securities with low interest rates accordingly to the low risk level
perceived by the market. As CIBRASEC does not present the same favorable conditions,
it is being formed by strongly acknowledged institutions in the country. Most of the more
important banks operating in Brazil had confirmed their participation in this company.
Goldman Sachs and I.F.C. are also expected to join the partnership.
4.2.2.4 - The Mortgage Banks (Companhias Hipotecarias)
25 Pinto de Lima, L. E.., Securitizagdo de Recebiveis, Securitizagio de Recebiveis Conference org.
by FEBRABAN. S. Paulo, Brazil, June 1997.
Another piece of this new financing model are the mortgage banks (companhias
hipotecarias), regulated institutions that need an authorization of the Banco Central to
operate. Their main operational targets are real estate financing, trade and management of
mortgage receivables and of F.I.Is (Real Estate Investment Funds), covering all the real
estate sectors, from shopping centers to residential, from hotels to hospitals, without yield
ceiling restrictions. The first companhia hipoteciria in Brazil was constituted by the Bank
of Boston in mid 1996. In mid 1997, three were authorized by the government (Cobansa
and Citibank are the others). They may obtain funds through the issue of debentures or
other operations authorized by the Banco Central. They may also link the borrower or the
loan originator to a companhia securitizadora through the desired standardized
procedures.
4.2.2.5 - The S.F.I. Objectives
The SFI is expected to improve the geographical distribution of real estate capital,
decentralizing the current preponderance of the SFH in the major cities. It is expected to
lead to the creation of a Secondary Mortgage Market in the next months. Risks would be
segmented: the credit generation risks, related mostly to documentation, would remain
with the loan originator; the borrower default risk would be shifted to the Companhia
Securitizadora, and interest rate risks would be conveyed to the final investors. Indexation
ultimately transfers inflation risks to borrowers.
The initial target of the S.F.I. would be the existing real estate properties (residential,
offices, shopping centers, hotels or industrial). Nonetheless, it is allowed to also finance
new developments. As explains Fleury, financing only existing properties is fundamental to
diminish the risks at least in the first operation years2 6. Commercial banks, through the
S.F.H. if its conditions are met, may offer financing to the shorter-term construction
period.
In the residential sector, the S.F.I. may shift the country's general thinking about housing.
It may enhance the idea that what is important is the availability of decent housing for all,
rented or owned. In the recent past, successive laws supposedly protecting tenants
unbalanced the rental residential market in the longer term. The relative deregulation in
the last years in this market may permit residential leasing to become an investment
opportunity. As the existing S.F.H. still possesses an important volume of generated loans,
it still will go on working simultaneously with the S.F.I., continuing to offer loans to the
lower income population. Moreover, improvements on some of its new contracts have
been suggested to allow that part of its receivables could be used by the S.F.I. These
changes would initially be related to free credit analysis, amortization, minimal guarantees,
and other property's possession interdiction from the rules that govern the S.F.H. In a
second phase, they may include the fiduciary alienation, free interest rates determination
and competitively priced credit insurance, provided after open competition.
26 Fleury, Carlos E.D., Ibid.
4.3 Equity Securities
4.3.1 The F.I.I.s- Fundos de Investimento Imobiliario (Real Estate Funds
Investments Funds)
4.3.1.1 - Overview
This category of investment was created in June of 1993 and regulated in 1994. The first
real estate investment funds began to operate in 1995, and in April 1997, 41 were active
with approximately US$500 million in distributed shares27 . F.I.I.s have been formed as
equity funds and need to sell all its shares to be considered effectively constituted.
Nevertheless, the new law regulating the S.F.I., under approval of the Congress, allows
F.I.I.s to exclusively invest in real estate mortgages and debt securities.
In many respects, the F.I.I.s may be compared to the U.S. REITs (see table 1). Similar to
REITs, they are required to concentrate their revenue sources in leasing or selling real
estate; they are not allowed to operate owned properties. At least 75% of the F.I.I. assets
are required to be allocated to real estate. The management of the funds is done through a
financial institution in a fiduciary capacity, segregated from the institution's other assets
27 Fundos Imobilidrios Constituidos, James Andrew International, April 1997.
Table 1 - Comparison Between F.I.I.s and REITs
F.I.I. REIT
Objective real estate leasing/selling real estate leasing/selling
Allocation > 75% in real estate >75% in r.e., cash and
government securities, among
other restrictions
Asset Segregation yes yes
Normal Investment mostly development of specified or unespecified
Destination one specific project
Number of Shares open-ended open-ended
Mngt Owning Shares no yes ( typically 5 to 45%)
Ownership Dispersion no yes (more than 100
shareholders, limits on
ownership concentrations)
Dividend Distribution no yes (95% of taxable income)
Obligation
Minimum Real Property no yes / no more than 30% of
Holding Period income from property held less
than 4 years
Use of Debt no yes (normally between 30 and
40%)
Capitalization US$ 496 million28  US$ 120 billion 29
Taxes at Corporate Level no no
Varieties equity (debt F.I.I on equity, debt(mortgage) or
approval on S.F.I. law) hybrid
28Fundos Imobilidrios Constituidos, James Andrew International, April 1997.
29 As of June 30, 1997. Vinocur, Barry, Commercial Property in an Early Stage of Ownership
Shift, Barron's, August 4, 1997, p. 42.
and liabilities. Detailed public disclosure of investment's information is required from the
managers. The securities' maturity may be stated or not. The investment objective of a
F.I.I. may be specific or generic. Most of these funds, however, have a specific investment
objective, related to an well determined project.
4.3.1.2 - The Use of the F.I.I. in New Developments
In some aspects, the F.I.I. are less restrained than REITs. Specifically, they do not (I)
present ownership dispersion requirements, (II) need to distribute a minimum percentage
of annual income in the form of dividends, or (III) have to hold their assets for minimum
durations before disposing of them without penalty. The lack of these constraints makes
the F.I.I. arguably more appropriate to finance new developments than U.S. REITs. The
use of REITs as a vehicle to fund development is polemical in the U.S. REITs seem to be
suited for owners of properties that currently generate cash-flow, with the attendant tax
advantages and minimum dividend policy.
A development company may be comparable to a high-tech company, whose value is
based more in growth opportunities than in current cash-flows. In this case, as most of the
cash flow is plowed back to fund investment, dividend distribution requirements are a
constraint, and taxes at the corporate level are not as important3 0 . Also, the dispersed
ownership required by REIT regulation may not be as appropriate with respect to how
decisions have to be made in a development company, and may be not the best way to
monitor the management action. The four year asset holding period rule may be an
important constraint to the flexibility of a development company. One last issue is the
patience required to wait for the results in development transactions; REIT investors are
not used to being patient.
The use of F.I.I.s in financing developments, combined with their non-real estate assets
limit (25%), are responsible for the partial payment completion profile of most of the F.I.I.
issues. Investment is undertaken accordingly to the development necessities, following a
budget previously approved. Additional guarantees, such as performance bonds, are
offered by the manager as a form of insurance (and included in the fund's expenses) to the
F.I.I.'s development investor against construction delays and the consequent beginning of
revenues. To be characterized as an equity investment, regulations do not allow the
manager of the F.I.I. to guarantee minimum annual yields, but in some cases fund sponsors
(the developer, for example) have done it. As a substitute for the lack of a secondary
market, some sponsors have offered long-term repurchase agreements as a de facto
guarantee to their investors.
30 Riddiough, Timothy, ibid, pg 91.
As the F.I.I.s are exempt from income taxes at the fund level, double taxation is avoided.
They are also exempt from PIS3 and COFINS32 . Taxes are generally restricted to 10% of
profits and capital gains to local investors, and 10% on profits only to foreign investors.
Any capital gains arising from liquidation of the portfolio are exempt from income tax.
This tax structure may offer substantial competitive advantages to investors in a F.I.I. who
are interested in financing a real estate development.
4.3.1.3 - The Structure of a F.I.I.
Five steps are required to form a F.I.I.:
1. The developer defines the investment opportunity, the physical product and secures
the necessary entitlements;
2. A financial institution is chosen to secure additional financial permits and to
communicate financial information to the market;
3. An independent consultant's report regarding the soundness of the financial statements
is required;
4. The project is taken to C.V.M to be analyzed, and approved for securities to be issued;
5. The securities are sold and the project is acquired or developed.
31 PIS (Social Integration Program) is a 0.65% over gross income tax, deductible for tax income
purposes.
3 COFINS (Social Contribution for Social Security Financing) is a 2% over the gross income tax
deductible for tax income purposes.
Recent securities issues, however, have generally followed a slightly different process. In
particular, developers have defined the opportunity and offered the F.I.I. to the most
probable investors before taking it to the C.V.M. In doing so, they have collected criticism
and suggestions from the targeted investors in advance of issuing the securities, so that
changes can be easily made, if necessary.
The managing institution in a F.I.I. is not allowed to buy shares in the F.I.I. it manages.
This prohibition was established to avoid agency conflicts, but it also eliminates a desirable
alignment of interests between shareholders and managers. The F.I.I.s are not allowed to
use debt to finance their operations. As the F.I.I. acquires an property, the transfer tax
ITBI (between 2 and 6% of the value of the property, depending on the city regulation) is
normally due. To avoid this tax liability, a number of projects have allowed title to the
property to remain with the previous owner, when the owner would participate as an
investor in the fund. This structure compromises the desired risk segregation that a F.I.I.
should provide, as the property would not be protected anymore in the case of the
owner's bankruptcy. Other F.I.I.s have been freed from the ITBI payment through
municipal incentives. The leverage constraint and the ITBI tax have been frequent
obstacles to the F.I.I.'s wider acceptance.
4.3.1.4 - Restrictions to Pension Funds and Foreign Investors
Until recently, investments in F.I.I. received the same regulatory treatment as stocks in
pension fund's portfolios, being able to compromise up to 50 % of these investment
portfolios. The resolution 2324 of October 1996 from Banco Central subsequently
differentiated the real estate funds, limiting their participation to 10% of the pension
fund's investments.
In 1993, the selling of fixed-income securities to foreigners was restricted. At that time,
the excessive arrival of money taking advantage of the country's very high interest rates
and invested in indexed funds exarcebated inflationary effects. Analysts attribute a number
of the first F.I.I. issues to a creative way to overcome this hurdle. Until February 1996, if a
F.I.I. was not completed, either for not selling all its shares or for project permit problems,
for example, the invested funds would be returned to the investor with fixed income yields
added. In this way, some FI issues were engineered specifically to not be approved, in a
disguised fixed income investment to foreigners. In February 1996, in order to avoid this
use of the F.I.I.s, the government established an IOF3 3 payment on the ones that do not
begin operations and to foreign investments that remain less than one year in the funds.
4.3.1.5 - Recent Trends on F.I.I.s
33 IOF is the Tax on Financial Operations. It is levied at varying rates on certain foreign
operations, being added to the cost of each transaction. Dividends, repayment of loans, repatriation
of capital and remittance of interest payments are in general not subject to IOF; nonetheless, this
tax may be used as an instrument to incentive long term investments, decreasing with the term,
reaching 0 for investments with terms greater or equal to three-years. In the beginning of 1997, the
IOF charged on foreign fixed income investments decreased from 7% to 2%.
The largest F.I.I. thus far is a US$ 215 million fund (still not closed) formed by Cindam to
develop and build a tourist complex north of Salvador, in the Bahia State. It includes
selling and leasing revenues, and additionally offers a kind of insurance, guaranteeing
payment of dividends to investors after two years from the date of issuance if operations
have not begun. The promised yields of most F.I.I. issues have been around 15% per year
plus inflation. The historical data of returns on existing F.I.I.s have not been distributed to
the market yet. This fact raises doubts as to whether enough attention has been paid to
information quality, which is crucial to the development of a secondary market. Sergio
Belleza, a consultant with James Andrew International, urges a stronger communication
effort with, and the resulting disclosure to the market analysts and their association,
ABAMEC, to give to these professionals more relevant information to bring investors to
the F.I.I.s3 4 .
The law regulating the S.F.I. allows the constitution of F.I.I.s to invest exclusively in any
real estate debt security, as the C.R.I.s. Prudent management of these funds would avoid
the repetition of the history of the mortgage REITs in the U.S.. These corporations were
very active in the late 1960s and early 1970s collecting short-term money in the public
markets and financing at long-term construction and new development. This mismatching
of liabilities, combined with the recession and inflation of the mid-1970s, provoked losses
in operations and high levels of default, in a serious crisis that ended the use of mortgage
REITs for the next decades.
1 Belleza F., S6rgio O.D. interview on June, 3 1997, S.Paulo, Brazil.
Chapter 5 - Participants in the Brazilian Real Estate Securitization
Process
5.1 The Government
Real estate securitization is interesting to the government as it promises to improve the
country's investment instruments, enhance its financial system, and improve the credit
analysis standards in the market. Securitization can be a powerful instrument to capture
foreign investments, a priority to this government's objectives and necessities.
Additionally, a successful real estate securitization process would also benefit with
additional profits the state-owned banks, with positive effects in government finances.
Furthermore, it would convey resources to the construction sector, acknowledged as the
most important low-skilled job absorber in the country.
The proposed securitization initiatives are essentially market oriented, managed by private
initiative, independent of direct governmental subsidies and not intended to create deficits
in the national budget. The government seems to be aware of the damages to this system
that could come from introducing subsidies into it. This non-intervention policy has led to
the avoidance of governmental guarantees to investors, contrary to what happened in the
U.S. real estate securitization. The question here is how will the investors feel about the
non- guaranteed yields and the interest rates they will require.
The S.F.I. would not contemplate social projects that can only be achieved through
governmental subsidies. However, securitization may be a viable alternative to the existing
official real estate financing system, exhausted and carrying financial deformations from
the past. It would be able to complement and broaden this system, creating institutional
means to finance non-residential real estate developments, such as offices, shopping-
centers, hospitals, industrial plants and hotels.
5.2 The Banks and the Financial Institutions
The S.F.I. project was developed by ABECIIP (Savings and Real Estate Credit Entities'
Brazilian Association). ABECIP is formed by leading Brazilian and foreign commercial
banks dealing with real estate loans and mortgages. In elaborating their proposal,
ABECIP studied diverse countries' models to build their model and chose a significant
part of its paradigms from the U.S. securitization system. The ABECIP's concern resulted
from their concern with risks of an governmental initiative carrying excessive regulation
that could deform the system and spoil a good idea. Moreover, ABECIP decided to
pioneer a system independent of the government subsidies and political abuse that led to
problems as the F.C.V.S. deficit. Real estate investments have been traditionally a
profitable sector to the banks, and the S.F.I. is expected to adjust favorably their
perspectives in this area. The approval of the fiduciary alienation would bring more
tranquillity to the mortgage industry. Best practices in underwriting, production of
standards for credit generation with lesser costs of rating and operation, better
understanding of guarantees by investors, more liquidity to mortgage loans, and new
services to be offered to the market are the project's pluses to the financial sector, says L.
E. Pinto Lima".
5.3 Capital Providers
5.3.1 - Pension Funds and Insurance Companies
Pension funds are a primary target in the Brazilian real estate securitization process, in
1997. In addition to being the biggest institutional investors in the country's economy.
Brazilian pension funds are the biggest participants in Brazilian real estate investments. In
the beginning of 1997, 349 pension fund entities patronized by 1596 governmental, public
and private companies were active in Brazil. They have accumulated in their 19 years of
existence approximately US$ 70 billion in assets. These assets represent less than 10% of
the country's GDP, a modest number when compared to the U.S. and U.K. pension funds
participation, which represents approximately 70% of GDP. Ten of these pension funds
(eight originated from governmental companies) account for approximately 60% of these
assets, invested on behalf of 1.8 million of participants and having more than 7 million
beneficiaries 36.
C.M.N.(National Monetary Council) is the governmental organ that establishes rules
* Pinto de Lima, L. E.., Securitizagdo de Recebiveis, Securitizagio de Recebiveis Conference, org. by
FEBRABAN, S. Paulo, Brazil, June 1997.
36 Schonenberg, L. G. and Souza Gurgel, J. L., Os Fundos de Pensdo no Brasil, Revista Trevisan,
Issue 107, Jan 1997, pg 24-32.
related to diversification and risk-control in pension funds investment. The Central Bank
of Brazil (BACEN) is the institution responsible for the execution of these policies and for
the control and regulation of the financial institutions and foreign investment. Its
Resolution 2324, released in October 1996, limited direct investments in real estate to
20% of fund assets in 1997, decreasing 1% per year until a 15% cap is reached in 2001.
This same resolution also limited investments in real estate funds to 10% of the pension
fund's assets, while bonds, in general, are limited to 80% of the pension fund portfolio,
and stocks, 50%. The pension funds are still forbidden to participate in more than 20% of
any security issue. This last determination brought disincentives to pension funds to invest
in smaller real estate projects and was badly received by analysts.
Distortions coming from cumulative defined-benefit plans and early retirement (not with
age, but with time of contribution) unbalanced the governmental social security system,
with serious effects on the country's economy health. These distortions are the suject of a
reform in the pension system also to be approved by the Congress. This reform is expected
to contribute to the growing presence of a complementary security funds system. A
general shift of the new pension fund plans from defined-benefit to defined-contribution is
occurring in Brazil as well as in the U.S., where this shift has enhanced the mutual funds
that are offered to the contributor's investment choice. On this trend, Mike Miles argues
that mutual funds look for investments with tax advantages, and prefer to invest in
securities instead of direct real estate, making commercial real estate securitization growth
inevitable3 7
The pension funds have changed their investment profile in Brazilian real estate over the
last years. In 1996/1997, they preferred to invest in larger high-level office buildings
instead of offices in general, as they did some years ago. They have also increased their
participation in the governmental companies being privatized and in the previously family
owned companies becoming public. They have changed their behavior as investors, too,
gradually increasing their participation in the management boards of the companies in
which they invest and being active on demanding timely payment of dividends,
establishing a practice not yet completely embraced throughout the market. Even if not all
the Brazilian pension funds are at the same point in the road between "building-picking" to
a more strategic portfolio approach, it is generally acknowledged that real estate
investments may be considered a separate asset class, instead of simply another industry
sector. This consideration comes from the fact that real estate investments have long
duration and residual capital gains matched to pension funds liabilities, and leads to
position real estate as a strategic part of the diversification of their portfolios.
The same desired asset/liability matching occurs in insurance companies. A number of
companies, among them Aetna, Hartford, MetLife, Travelers and Liberty, with
international presence and real estate investment experience, are entering the country
37 Miles, Mike, Real Estate Securitization: It is only a question of how much and how soon, Real Estate
Finance, Summer 1996, pg 1-2.
through partnerships or the opening of their own offices. The market expects that they will
invest increasingly in real estate with the improving opportunities and instruments
available.
5.3.2 - The Foreign Investors
The real estate securitization process is also directed toward foreign investment. Naturally,
these investments will be attracted to Brazilian real estate securities if their returns
adequately compensate for perceived risks. Without a secondary market as an exit
strategy, foreign capital requirements may possibly stay in the levels they are today, with
yields around 15% per year plus inflation (normally measured by the IGP- Prices General
Index). These yields would group the Brazilian real estate securities together with the
opportunity investments that currently occupy the periphery of the institutional foreign
investor's portfolio, where liquidity is not the fundamental issue. These opportunistic
investments constituted 20% of U.S. pension funds real estate investments in 1996, and
their participation was supposed to grow in the next years".
Normally, an investment in a foreign country yields a lower correlation to a company's
investment portfolio than an investment in its own country. In theory, an investment in
Brazil will be less risky to an U.S. investor than to a Brazilian investor. In this way, the
diversified foreign investor should require lower yields than those required by a national.
3 McCadden, Daniel and McNally ,Peter , US. Pension Fund Investments in Real Estate:
Current and Future Investment Strategy, Real Estate Finance, Winter 1997, pg 46-57
But the extra costs incurred to understand and choose between foreign investments, and
fear of changing rules, undermine this otherwise rational result.
The general conditions to foreign investments in Brazil should also be examined. Direct
international investments in Brazil must be converted to Real through the so-called
commercial exchange rate, controlled by the Banco Central. The process is not
complicated, but must be managed by a financial institution authorized by the Banco
Central. Brazilians and foreign tourists must use the floating exchange rate, normally with
higher foreign currency prices. In the beginning of 1997, the Brazilian government lifted a
ban on derivative trades as hedging techniques used by foreigners. This ban was imposed
in 1995 to avoid "boxed" hedge operations that amounted to the fixed-income
instruments, taking advantage of the high interest rates, and fueling inflation. The lifting of
that ban was supposed to contribute to the flow of foreign investment to the country.
Currency hedging may be provided through buying NTN Cambiais, securities guaranteed
by the government with interest rates of 8% per year, in dollars. The longer maturity NTN
Cambiais currently have 3-year terms, with reasonable liquidity, accordingly to Mauro
Schneider, economist with the ING Barings Bank, in S. Paulo 39. The NTN Cambiais can
be considered a benchmark to foreign investment in Brazil, as they only carry the
country's systematic risk. Other possible benchmarks are the long-term fixed income
global bonds, recently issued by the Brazilian government, with yields of around 10% per
year, in dollars.
39 Schneider, M., telephonic interview on July, 27, 1997.
Comparing the S.F.I. model to the U.S., the Brazilian government is not offering
guarantees on issued securities. Additionally, Fannie Mae had no competitors in the U.S.
market for a long time, strengthening its position and developing the market's trust.
CIBRASEC is supported by strong names, but its monopolist position as a securitizer
corporation may only be temporary. Consequently, these factors may a material effect on
the interest rates that foreign investors require.
5.4 Capital Users
5.4.1 - The Development and Construction Sector
A successful securitization process is enhanced by a strong real estate market. The
development and construction sectors reflect these opportunities, as they will generally
produce new supply only with the expectation of rents leading to positive NPVs on the
discounted cash-flows.
The construction sector in Brazil represents approximately 8% of the country's GDP, and
employing 1.2 million people40 . The trade opening of the country, the technological
4 0 Unsigned Article. 0 Setor de Construgio Encontrou o seu Caminho, Opinido Trevisan, Issue 107, Jan
1997, pg 6.
improvements, and the availability of new sources of material have all contributed to
decrease construction costs by an average of 3% over the last two years".
The available numbers indicate investment and development opportunities in the Brazilian
real estate markets. The country's housing deficit is estimated at between 5 and 15 million
houses. This extremely large range is fueled by the fact that different organizations use
different criteria to measure the deficit, inconsistently including precarious houses in the
calculations. The residential deficit is more serious in the cities, as nearly 80 % of Brazil's
population lives in urban environments. Even if part of the residential deficit can only be
treated through social governmental programs, a large portion of the housing sector may
be reached through the right financing instruments. US$ 35.5 billion is the estimated
investment in the housing sector that is needed to meet the current demand in the
country4.
With respect to the retail sector, shopping center sales have increased more than 30% per
year since 1992. Shopping center sales contribution is still small when compared to other
countries (in the beginning of 1997, Brazil had 136 shopping centers that contributed to
17% of the country's retail sales, excepting automobile trade, in contrast to 41,235
shopping centers in the U.S. responsible for 58% of the retail sales)43 . The best investment
41 Amaral, Paulo N., Quais as possibilidades de Investimento diante das Estimativas de Taxas de Juros no
Bienio 97/98, Financiamentos para Empreendimentos Imobiliirios Conference Notes, org. by Institute for
International Research, S. Paulo, June 1997.
42 Unsigned Article, Habitagdo: Classe com Prego Baixo. Brasil em Exame 1996, supplement to Revista
Exame, Jan 1997, pp. 48-51.
4 Pinto de Lima, L. E.. Securitizagdo de Recebiveis. Securitizagio de Recebiveis Conference org. by
FEBRABAN. S. Paulo, Brazil, June 1997.
and development opportunities seems to reside in the large number of medium cities not
served by this kind of retail.
Entertainment centers and hospitality uses also have high growth potential. At the end of
1996, Brazil had only 14 well-equipped resort centers (the Caribbean area had
approximately 3,000)44.
Industrial investments have been decentralized, as a number of companies have migrated
from the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo to the less unionized and less taxed regions of the
country.
Commercial investment and development opportunities in the big urban areas have been
mapped by local and international brokerage and consulting companies, and must be added
to the expanding demand in the medium-sized cities mentioned above. The potential of
investment for meeting the demand is estimated in US$ 25 billion per year, 150% above of
what was invested in 199645.
New development and construction opportunities have attracted foreign developers and
contractors to the Brazilian market. The most valuable contribution from the foreigners is
supposed to occur in areas such as building technology and financial strategies, along with
access to broader sources of capital. In 1996, George Soros, through Brazil Realty, a
44 O Brasil em Exame1996, ibid.
45 Ibid.
partnership with Brazilian Cyrella, began to invest in the country's shopping-center,
residential and commercial markets. Other recent partnerships have put together Metodo
from Brazil and Tischman Speyer from the U.S., and Birmann (Brazil) with Turner
Construction (U.S.), to invest in commercial and residential opportunities.
Securitization may mean a new and important capital source to the construction sector.
This sector has suffered with the constraints of the high cost of financing in the last years.
Real estate securitization could mean decreasing the gap between the demand for, and
supply of financing. Additonally, institutional investments from pension funds have begun
to occur in the country, and securitization may mean more resources to the construction
sector, distributed by clearer criteria. Real estate securitization may also change the
industry, pushing up its disclosure standards to make them more in line with investor's
expectations. Cobansa's (one of the three authorized companhias hipotecarias) service
offering illustrates these possible improvements46 . Accordingly to their proposal,
commercialization risks (velocity and conditions of sales/rents) would be understood and
quantified through market research, viability studies, formalized credit and sale policies,
contractual insurance, and rating of the operations. Construction risks would be hedged
through the use of contractor's performance bonds, quality insurance and external
monitoring. Credit risks may be better understood through rating and standardized credit
policies and instruments. Finally, credit management, related to appropriate funding of
46 Klumb, Pedro, Avaliando a Estrutura das Operagues de Securitizagdo de Recebiveis Imobilidrios sob
a Otica das Companhias Hipotecirias, Cobansa S.A..
operations and management of the receivables, would have its risks controlled through
disclosure of information, standardized credit management policies, monitoring and rating.
5.4.2 - The Borrowers
Real estate securitization and the S.F.I. may not reach the lower income individual, as the
plans do not target the social segments that can only be reached through governmental
subsidies. But securitization can broaden the layers of population that have access to
mortgage loans. In the U.S., mortgage securitization brought more loans at lower rates
through the quasi-governmental agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac4 7 , as it avoided the
previous funneling of the resources coming only from the commercial banks.
Properties in the S.F.H. protected band (value of the property less than approximately
US$ 150,000) are subject to mortgage loans with interest rates of 12% per year plus
indexation. In the last years, developers have offered 8 to 10-year term direct financing
plans with the same conditions. In these cases, the S.F.I. interest rates, at least initially,
would not possibly be competitive. Borrowers would be benefited if the new system
broadened the availability of loans, imposing less credit restrictions to borrowers, if
prudent, or serving properties not served by any of these financing options. With the S.F.I.
consolidation, lower yields may be required by the investors, allowing the lower rates of
4 Recently, these companies have developed computerized underwriting systems to evaluate the credit
worthiness of a loan applicant. The non-approved loans have been sold to lending companies as
subprimes, to be packaged and sold to investors. This recent trend has been controversial, as it serves the
country's affordable house demand, but charging non-affordable interest rates to compensate the assumed
risks.
interest rates to borrowers. Furthermore, a secondary mortgage market, should it emerge,
may also lengthen habitation financing maturities.
To properties with values in excess of those comprised in the S.F.H. band, direct
developer's financing may still be present. But the S.F.I. may represent a competitive
option and may bring down the borrower's interest rates on these more valuable
properties.
Last but not least, the S.F.I. may serve as an important source of financing to commercial,
industrial and other kinds of real estate properties not served by the S.F.H. or by the
B.N.D.E.S (National Bank for the Economic and Social Development) 48. Borrowers
would then have a new source of financing, which would possibly reduce the interest rates
currently charged to finance such projects.
In all the cases, the general level of interest rates in the economy is primordial: a
secondary mortgage market can lower them through efficiency and risk control, but it can
not overcome the current interest rates. Professor Mirio Henrique Simonsen gives the
example 49: when interest rates go up by 2% per month, the monthly payment due increases
71.5% and maturity extensions do not help meaningfully. High interest rates affect the
borrower's payment capacity and menace the financial system's health. Inflation levels
4 Governmental institution that grants loans, most of them subsidized, to implement its investment and
development policies.
49 Simonsen, Mario H., Perspectivas do Sistema Financeiro Imobilidrio, SF1 - Um Novo Modelo
Habitacional Conference Notes, org. by ABECIP, Brasilia, Nov 1995, pg 28-33
matter. High inflation causes bring high price-dispersion and the probable mismatching
between the borrower's income and the amount due every month. These gaps are one of
the main problems responsible for the S.F.H. problems. On the other hand, economic
growth is beneficial to the system, as it increases borrower's paying capacity, thereby
decreasing default probabilities.
The fiduciary alienation may seem initially as a menace to the borrower. However, as the
current treatment of distressed mortgage loans benefits the distressed borrowers,
deregulated loans may include higher yields to cover the weakness of guarantees. Thus,
the distressed borrowers are subsidized by the whole universe of borrowers, in this case.
The S.F.I. project has some mechanisms to not transform distressed properties in a
profitable business to the financial institutions. Auctions in quick period of time, return of
money to borrower if the collected funds exceed the debt and a arbitrage chamber would
be instruments for the borrower's protection.
Chapter 6 - Conclusions
The process of real estate securitization in Brazil is in its infancy. The economic
importance of Brazil, its maturing financial markets and systems, the globalization of the
capital markets and the increasing demand for real estate securities argues for the
advancement of this process.
On the debt side, some private securitization has occurred. The securities are generally
well structured, but their costs avoid expanding their use. A more comprehensive
securitization plan, the S.F.I., is currently being structured. Its mechanisms have much in
common with the mortgage backed securities model in the U.S., and is intended to
broaden the supply of real estate financing in Brazil. Residential, industrial, commercial
and other kinds of real estate loans will serve as collateral. A corporation will buy and
package mortgages to issue securities, as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do in the U.S. One
of S.F.I.'s objectives is the creation of a secondary mortgage market in the country.
Standardization and enhancement of legal guarantees on collateral are crucial concerns
present in this initiative, currently under approval at the Federal Congress. The S.F.I.'s
targeted investors are mostly pension funds, insurance companies and foreign investors.
On the equity side, there are in operation in the country approximately 40 Fundos de
Investimento Imobiliirio (F.I.I.). Although comparable to U.S. REITs, the differences
between them have led the F.I.I. to be used mostly by closed groups for tax advantages in
financing new developments. This use of FI. does not lead to the complete achievement
of the advantages of real estate securities over direct investment in the underlying
properties, as liquidity, non-lumpiness, low transaction costs, easy diversification,
disclosure, discipline and professional management.
In general, all the initiatives related to real estate securitization have been done under the
control of the government and the scrutiny of the marketplace. However, the lack of a
secondary market has led to a investment preponderance of closed investment groups,
effectively defining the current Brazilian real estate securitization as a private
securitization. Even though information disclosure is clearly required by these instruments'
regulation, private securitization reduces the demand for information dissemination to the
public. A better information disclosure culture is a legitimate concern to the advancement
of public securitization.
Other concerns are related to the economy as a whole. A macro-economic scenario with
uncontrolled government deficits and high inflation rates would probably bring difficulties
too large to be surpassed by the securitization process. Inflation brings economic
disorganization and conflicts that would interfere in the clear relationships needed to
operate securitization. Long-term investment occurs when the investors feel sure that the
rules of the game will be maintained and respected. Only constancy and regulatory
coherence will enhance the institutional trustworthiness in the country and in its long-term
investment opportunities.
Additionally, the continuous governmental support for the securitization process is
fundamental. This support must come through control, but without excessive regulation.
Tax incentives, as exempting the F.I.I.s from the IBTI tax, could be even considered to
decrease the already high equilibrium interest rate of the operations. In a desirable
scenario, as the securitization matures and information begins to flow continuously,
political and institutional trustworthiness would lead to equilibrium interest rates
satisfying to both investors and borrowers, and managing to bring a meaningful volume of
capital to Brazilian real estate markets. In this situation, the critical mass needed for a
well-functioning system would be achieved, and real estate securitization would be able to
progress.
Appendix A - Taxes and Legal Considerations to Real Estate
Security Investments
This appendix includes a very quick overview of the Brazilian taxes and legal dispositions
related to real estate securitization.
Corporations and most legal entities pay income taxes at rates of 15% on their annual net
income up to R$ 240,00050. There is an additional surtax of 10% on the net income
exceeding R$ 240,000. In any case, there is a surcharge of 8% of Social Contribution on
the total net income. To illustrate, supposing a net income of R$1,000,000:
Net income
Social Contribution (8% * $1,000,000)
Corporate Income tax (15% * $240,000)
Corp inc tax + surtax (25% * $760,000)
Net inc after income tax
0% withholding inc. tax on dividend
Net dividend received by shareholder
1,000,000
(80,000)
(36,000)
(190,000)
694,000
694,000
Interest on capital and rents are subject to a 15% withholding income tax, as fixed income
5 0 Unsigned Article, Brazil 1997 Basic Business Information, Arthur Andersen, 4t edition, April 1997,
p.12
funds. Dividend payments are exempt of the withholding tax, as shown in the example.
Convertible debentures issued by Special Purpose Companies to finance real estate
developments are subject to the withholding income tax since May 1997. This measure
came as a reaction to capital entering by factoring institutions to finance consumption,
which contributed to the country's trade deficit balance. As long-term real estate
investments have clearly different characteristics, there are chances that the pressure on
Government to open an exception to this kind of investments would be successful.
IOF is the Tax on Financial Operations. It is levied at varying rates on certain foreign
operations, being added to the cost of each transaction. In the last years it has been
imposed only to payments not characterized as " technology transfer fees"". In any case,
this tax is deductible as an expense before the income tax calculation. Dividends,
repayment of loans, repatriation of capital and remittance of interest payments are in
general not subject to IOF; nonetheless, this tax may be used as an instrument to incentive
long term investments, decreasing with the term, reaching 0% to investments with terms
superior to three-years. In the beginning of 1997, the IOF charged on foreign fixed income
investments came down from 7% to 2%.
Securities financing real estate may bring important competitive fiscal advantages to the
financed project. Apart from direct incentives, indirect taxes as COFINS and PIS are not
due in securities financed projects. COFINS (Social Contribution for Social Security
Financing) is a 2% over the gross income tax deductible for tax income purposes that does
51 Ibid., p. 16.
not apply to financial institutions in general. Financing through securities is exempt of the
PIS (Social Integration Program) - a 0.65% over gross income, also deductible for tax
income purposes.
IPTU ( Urban Territorial Property Tax) is a municipal property tax calculated as a
percentage between 0 and 5% of the market value of any urban property. IBTI (Real
Estate Transmission Tax) is a 2 to 6% tax payable by the buyer when a property is sold or
transferred.
Appendix B - A Brief History of U.S. Real Estate Securitization
The real estate securitization process in the U.S. began in the Roosevelt post-depression
era, with the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank system, which enhanced confidence
and liquidity to the market through the setting of deposit insurance. The action of the
Federal Housing Administration, targeted to first-time home buyers, enlarged the market
and contributed to increased standardization.
FNMA ("Fannie Mae") was created as an institutional mortgage purchaser, increasing
mortgages' liquidity and contributing to the geographical distribution of the available
capital. For many years, Fannie Mae was responsible for these relatively simple and limited
activities. Fundamental improvements to the secondary mortgage occurred between 1968
and 1970. In 1968, Fannie Mae was privatized and was allowed to repackage and sell the
loans bought in the primary market. Before 1968, even with the FHA guarantee, in case of
default the investor still faced problems of delays, resulting in unpredictable cash-flows
and reduction of final yields. GNMA ("Ginnie Mae") solved this problem through
charging the buyer a guarantee fee and providing the investor with a guarantee of timely
payment of principal and interests and the repayment of outstanding loan balances in the
event of prepayment or default. Now default risk was avoided by FHA insurance and
timely payment of principal was secured by GNMA, and the timing of outstanding
principal prepayment was the only investor's uncertainty.
However, by the early 1970's, FHA loans mortgages accounted for approximately 20%
of total loans, and conventional loans generated by thrifts were not securitizable. In 1970
Congress created FHLMC ("Freddie Mac") to provide the conventional loans with
liquidity, as FNMA and GNMA had done for FHA loans. The Federal Home Loan Banks
guaranteed FHLMC obligations and competition between FHLMC and FNMA was
enhanced.
These measures produced a liquid mortgage market, packaged in standardized
instruments, with credit risk eliminated, and access to enormous sources of capital.
Maturities were extended, and the typical loans were standardized as long-term (30-year)
fully amortizing with fixed interest rates, or 15-year ARM- Adjusted Rated Mortgages,
standardized and legitimized in the 70's due to the oil crisis inflation. Standardization of
procedures and documentation was improved due to FNMA and FHLMC requirements,
allowing the substantial volume of transactions that was reached.
During this process, the positive contribution of the government came fundamentally from
tax advantages instead of subsidies. Interest payments on mortgage loans were deductible
for the tax purposes; swaps between loans and securities were also exempt of taxation.
From 1970 on, creativity of financial engineering produced new securities that added value
to investors, improving information exchange and making possible a better risk
distribution among investors, in this way enlarging the investment opportunities. Ginnie
Mae's action generated an explosion in the secondary mortgage market and the possibility
of the formation of pools of mortgages to generate "pass-through" mortgage backed
securities collaterized by mortgages. The mortgage backed securities are subject to more
credit and market risks than other fixed income investments because of both default risks
and prepayment risks. Overcollaterizing is a common solution to these additional risks,
and is normally easier to implement than offering guarantees. The first issue of MBS by
Fannie Mae occurred in 1981.
CMOs (Commercial Mortgage Obligations), generally shift prepayment risk from safe
shortest-lived tranches to residual longer-lived ones. CMBSs (Commercial Mortgage
Backed Securities) are generally subject to default risk, shifting it from senior to junior
tranches.
In 1996, residential mortgage-backed securities reached 50% of this mortgage market,
with approximately US$1.6 trillion outstanding. The enormous expansion of these
securities seems to be due to their contribution toward pushing up the risk-return curve of
investor's and the great amount of money available at the end of the 1970s (petrodollars),
followed in the 1980s by the Japanese capital and in the 1990s by the global market
capital.
The early 1990s commercial real estate depression generated the impressive recent growth
of both CMBSs and REITs. Securitization was the way RTC (Resolution Trust
Corporation, a governmental entity) chose to liquidate quickly its nearly 6,000 financially
distressed commercial loans. In the mid 1990s, many traditional whole loan lenders, such
as insurance companies and banks, decided to liquidate their debt portfolios, frustrated
with their poor results. The CMBS structure, with diverse levels of subordination and
risks, was then very useful to attract investors to these assets. Normally, outsiders bought
the less risky securities (the senior tranches), and the issuers kept the riskier ones ( the
junior tranches). Growth opportunities from the current depressed prices were enough to
cover Wall Street start up costs and underwriting expenses, resulting in good returns to
investors.
With the return of private capital to high quality (class A) commercial buildings in 1994,
most of CMBS issuances have been generated by conduits, collaterized by loans
originated specifically for securitization purposes, normally related to class B commercial
buildings.
A secondary market is still not well developed for CMBSs. This lack of an exit possibility
added to the regulatory constraints associated with owning lower tranches, have restrained
a more expressive volume of pension fund participation in these securities.
REITs are real estate investment corporations exempt from taxation at the corporate level
if certain structural and operating requirements are met. The REITs can be separated in
two kinds of classes: equity REITs, that own properties and generate cash-flow from
leasing and selling the properties, and mortgage REITs, that get revenues mostly from
interest received on loans to real estate owners. As REITs are traded as infinite life stocks,
they bring liquidity, non-lumpiness, low transaction costs, easy diversification, disclosure,
discipline and professional management to real estate investment.
The current REITs are mostly equity REITs, using little debt and substantial operating
economies of scale to compete. Their presence has increased substantially in the mid
1990s, as real estate owners needed to recapitalize their companies and private capital was
unavailable. Reaching the public markets through the organization of a REIT was in a
number of cases the chosen solution to this problem. In a generally depressed real estate
environment, the REITs' growth opportunities were acknowledged and an IPO (Initial
Public Offering) boom occurred.
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